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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 10-4232 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DAVID IRVIN, 
Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-03-cr-00207-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 27, 2011 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed June 14, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant David Irvin appeals an order of the District Court revoking his 
supervised release.  Irvin‟s counsel filed a brief arguing that all of the potential issues for 
appeal are frivolous and requesting permission to withdraw under Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We disagree with counsel‟s assessment of Irvin‟s appeal and, 
following the procedure outlined in United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 302 (3d Cir. 
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2001), will discharge current counsel, appoint substitute counsel, restore the case to the 
calendar, and order supplemental briefing in accordance with this opinion. 
I. 
After entering a guilty plea on a charge of possession of a stolen firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), Irvin was sentenced to 57 months in prison, to be 
followed by three-year term of supervised release.  He was released from prison, and 
entered supervised release, on November 1, 2007.  A general condition of Irvin‟s release 
was that he not commit another federal, state, or local crime.  On June 8, 2010, the United 
States Probation Office petitioned for revocation of Irvin‟s release for violating that 
condition based on Irvin‟s May 27, 2010 arrest and subsequent state-law charge with 
delivery of a controlled substance and criminal use of a communication facility.   
The District Court held a revocation hearing on October 13, 2010.  The 
government presented criminal complaints and dockets from the Dauphin County Court 
of Common Pleas documenting charges arising out of the May 27 arrest and another, 
earlier arrest, also involving drugs.  One of the complaints includes a probable-cause 
affidavit from a narcotics agent.  The government did not present testimony from the 
probation officer, the narcotics agent, or from any officer who was involved in the 
underlying arrests.  Irvin testified at the hearing that he did not commit the crimes, and 
defense counsel argued that the documents presented by the government were insufficient 
to meet the government‟s burden of proof because, among other things, Irvin had no 
opportunity to cross-examine the arresting officers.  The District Court disagreed and 
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issued an order revoking Irvin‟s supervised release and sentencing him to another 24 
months in prison. 
Irvin appealed the revocation order to our Court.  His attorney filed an Anders 
brief identifying only one issue for appeal:  whether the government presented sufficient 
evidence at the hearing to support the District Court‟s revocation order.  In two-and-a-
half pages of argument, the attorney concluded that the issue was frivolous because “the 
real issue is that the evidence must be reliable,” Appellant‟s Br. 10 (citing United States 
v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 733 (6th Cir. 1991)), and, in this case, “[t]here is no 
question that” the criminal complaints and docket information the government presented 
“is reliable,” id. at 11.  The attorney noted, further, that he “could have attempted to call 
the police officers and any informants involved” in the May 27 and April 9 arrests, id., 
but that the officers‟ testimony “would have undoubtedly been consistent with the 
information that was provided in the Affidavits of Probable Cause and Criminal 
Complaint” and the informants “would probably not have been required to testify by the 
Lower Court,” id. at 12.  Irvin‟s counsel subsequently moved to withdraw from his 
representation.  Irvin has not filed a pro se brief in support of his appeal. 
II. 
When counsel submits an Anders brief, our inquiry is “twofold:  (1) whether 
counsel adequately fulfilled the rule‟s requirements; and (2) whether an independent 
review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.  The 
Anders brief in this case founders on both prongs.   
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First, counsel‟s brief is woefully inadequate.  For one thing, it is difficult to tell 
from this record (which, unlike in Youla, does not contain a helpful pro se brief) whether 
counsel has identified all of the possible issues for appeal.  And, more importantly, it is 
clear that he did not urge what appears to us to be the best argument on appeal, namely 
the lack of reliable evidence to support the conclusion that Irvin had committed another 
crime.  Counsel‟s unsupported speculation about what may or may not have happened if 
he had “attempted to call the police officers and any informants involved” in the incidents 
that the District Court ultimately found justified the revocation of Irvin‟s supervised 
release is clearly insufficient.  Furthermore, the two-and-a-half page argument section 
does not cite any cases from this Court or even mention Irvin‟s right to cross-examine 
those officers, even though counsel presumably was aware of that right, since he alluded 
to it during the revocation hearing.  In short, here, as in Youla and in United States v. 
Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2000), “[c]ounsel simply has not provided sufficient 
indicia that he thoroughly searched the record and the law in service of his client.” 
Second, we are unwilling to conclude that Irvin‟s appeal is frivolous in light of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that govern revocation hearings and our decision in 
United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2009).  In Lloyd, we explained that 
defendants in revocation procedures enjoy limited due-process rights to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses.  Id. at 343 (citing and quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972)).  We observed that the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure specifically guarantee such defendants “„an opportunity to appear, present 
evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest 
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of justice does not require the witness to appear.‟”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32.1(b)(2)(c) (emphasis added)).  And we held a district court must weigh “[t]he 
reliability of proffered hearsay” against “the releasee‟s interest in confrontation” when 
considering whether a particular defendant has a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses 
in a particular case.  Id. at 344-45.  In this case, as in Lloyd, the District Court revoked 
Irvin‟s supervised release based on documents proffered by the government, without any 
live testimony and without considering Irvin‟s interest in confronting the officers or 
informants who were involved in his arrests.  At a minimum, Lloyd‟s application to this 
case raises a colorable issue for appeal, which any attorney representing Irvin must 
address. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reject Irvin‟s current counsel‟s Anders brief.  
We will grant current counsel‟s motion to withdraw, order the Clerk to discharge him, 
appoint substitute counsel, restore the case to the calendar, and set a new briefing 
schedule.  See Youla, 241 F.3d at 302. 
